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Abstract— This paper analyses relevant determinants 
for the probability to initiate a dispute on policy 
measures under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
dispute settlement system. The empirical analysis differs 
from existing assessments by focusing on agri-food 
related disputes and provides a more in-depth analysis 
of specific country and sectoral characteristics not 
considered in previous studies. Contrary to recent 
analyses of overall trade disputes, the results show that 
some determinants such as legal capacity and monetary 
means are not statistically significant. Own protectionist 
behaviour, endured protectionism, and the duration of 
WTO membership, however, could be identified as 
relevant determinants with the expected direction of 
impact. 
Keywords— WTO dispute, agri-food sector, binary 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The dispute settlement system of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) was set into force as a part of the 
WTO Agreement on January 1, 1995. It is the device 
for the resolution of conflicts arising between 
Members over the interpretation of their commitments 
under the regime of the organization. Dispute 
settlement must be self-enforcing, i.e. from the 
consultation to the potential compliance phase all 
actions are driven by Members. Referred to as the 
“central pillar of the multilateral trading system” [1] 
the design of the WTO dispute settlement system is 
central to the debate on institutional reforms of the 
WTO and has also been under negotiation at the 
current WTO Doha round of negotiations. A major 
desire is to make the settlement system more effective 
and to allow for the appropriate consideration of 
developing countries’ demands. Reform proposals 
span a wide field. However, the understanding of the 
factors that drive the system is required for targeted 
improvement. 
The question addressed in this paper is, therefore, 
which Members’ characteristics explain their activity 
as complainants in WTO food-related trade disputes. 
Compared to previous empirical studies, this 
investigation provides an in-depth analysis of food-
related disputes and considers new potential 
determinants that may supplement the understanding 
of what drives the use of the dispute settlement 
system. The empirical investigation is based on a 
dispute distribution model developed by [2]. 
The paper is organised as follows: The model 
description is followed by a discussion of considered 
determinants. Statistical implementation and 
estimation results are subsequently presented before 
concluding.  
II. A BINOMIAL DISPUTE INITIATION MODEL 
This analysis is based on the model first presented 
by [2]: The initiation decision is described through a 
binary choice model in which the Member’s 
probability to complain against another Member is 
dependent on a set of the complainant’s traits or the 
characteristics of its specific environment. The 
implicated conditional probability function for this 









=− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ x β x β x β , (1)  
where  ij y  is the binary dependent variable which takes 
1 for a complaint and 0 for no complaint, β  denotes 
the vector of K coefficients, i and  j  indicate the 
complainant and the defendant respectively. The set of 
K influences is merged in vector  i x . Function 
() x β ii π   calculates the individual probability to 
complain for a prospective complainant i. Here, we 
use the widely employed conditional logistic 
distribution,    2 
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  () () () exp 1 exp ii i i π =+ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ x β x β x β , (2) 
which would result in the well-known Logit model 
when applied to single trials. The proceeding for the 
assessment of determinants is the reproduction of the 
observed sample of dispute initiation over the period 
from January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2006 based on a 
dispute distribution function. Assuming that the 
probability for a litigation decision is constant from 
one trial to the next and that successive trials are 
independent, Member  ' is  probability for  i c  
complaints in  i n  trials against all other WTO 
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where  ii j
j
cy =∑ . The expected number of Member 
' is  complaints against all other WTO Members is 
then given by the expected value of the Binomial 
distribution,  
  () ( ) ii i i Ec n π = x β ,      ( 4 )  
which is strictly proportional to the number of 
independent Bernoulli trials  i n . 
The applied method is maximum likelihood 
estimation. Assuming that the data drawn from this 
Binomial distribution is independent and identically 
distributed with unknown parameter β  , the likelihood 



















− ⎡⎤ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦
⎝⎠ ∏
β x
x β x β
 (5) 
Restricting the vector of determinants to a constant, 
the probability to complain reduces to  i ππ =  for all 
Members and can be determined analytically by 
solving the first derivative of the logarithmic 







. Hence, for the restricted model, the 
maximum likelihood estimator of the probability to 
initiate a dispute is simply the number of observed 
complaints over the total number of independent 
Bernoulli trials.  
For the reason that we have no a priori information 
about the existence of inconsistent trade measures the 
analysis is based on an assumption about their 
distribution. For [2] the number of independent 
Bernoulli trials is dependent on a country’s export 
diversification, i.e. its number of different exported 
goods over all products and trading partners under the 
regime of the WTO. Each counted bilateral export 
flow is considered as one trial. They worked on the 
assumption that “disputable trade measures” (DTM) 
are uniformly distributed over all bilateral export 
flows. Following the approach of [2] we try to 
mitigate the problem of missing information about the 
distribution of infringements by incorporating two 
new indicators: Endured Protectionism by Trade 
Partner and Own Imposed Protectionism. In addition 
to this information on the likelihood of DTM in export 
flows, the attempt of [2] to select the relevant export 
flows is slightly modified by taking empirical instead 
of parameterized values for average induced litigation 
costs into account. 
III. DETERMINANTS CONSIDERED 
Disputes data: Dispute initiations were collected 
that affected products of the food sector.  The 
investigation covers the period from January 1, 1995, 
to June 30, 2006. For jointly filed initiations, each 
participant is assigned one dispute. When one Member 
simultaneously requests for consultations on the same 
subject but with different defendants each one is 
counted on its own.  
Export diversity: Here we adopt the approach first 
presented by [2]. The underlying principle lies in the 
expectation of an increased probability to encounter 
infringements if a Member’s export diversity 
increases. This is self-evident if we assume 
infringements to be uniformly distributed over all 
markets, products and trading partners. Hence, we 
expect the number of disputes to be positively related 
to Members’ amount of different bilateral export 
flows. Export flows come from [3] available on an 
aggregation level comparable to the HS-4-level.    3 
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Induced costs of litigation: [2] were the first 
analysing the litigation costs involved and 
demonstrated their relevance. Their approach is 
followed through the implementation of a threshold 
for counting a Member’s bilateral export flows, thus 
excluding flows under a certain value not being worth 
to fight for. According to calculations of [4], average 
costs for dispute settlement proceedings range from 
$128K to $706K. Hence, the analysis is conducted for 
four different litigation cost levels, i.e. excluding all 
flows below the respective threshold: $0 when no 
threshold is applied, $300K for low costs, $500K for 
medium costs and $700K for high litigation costs.  
Endured protectionism by trade partner: It is 
assumed that the more protective the trade policy of a 
country’s trading partners is, the higher the probability 
that it faces disputable trade barriers. Hence, we 
expect the number of initiated disputes to be positively 
related to a country’s faced trade restrictiveness. For 
this purpose the Market Access Overall Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (MA-OTRI) provided by [5] is 
used. It comprises a tariff equivalent of all barriers that 
exporters of the respective country face on average.    
Own protectionist behaviour: Another hypothesis is 
that the number of its filed disputes is negatively 
related to a country’s tendency towards protectionism. 
The rationale behind this is the assumption that a more 
protective Member faces also a greater likelihood to 
become “victim” of an accusation. We presume a 
more protective country to pursue a defensive and 
peaceful strategy to not provoke to be challenged 
itself. On the other hand we hypothesize that more 
protective countries have a lower propensity to fight 
for market liberalisation. For this purpose the Overall 
Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) by [5] is used as a 
measure for a country’s inclination to restrictive 
policies. It is a tariff equivalent for all trade barriers 
which the respective country imposes in average upon 
the rest of the world.  
Relevance of the agricultural sector: Independent 
from a country’s contact to a trading partner we expect 
the overall importance of the agricultural sector having 
a positive influence on initiating a case: the higher the 
overall economic relevance, the more sensitive a 
country may be regarding violations. To quantify the 
sector’s importance the agricultural share of a 
Member’s GDP is employed. The data is drawn from 
[6] and [7].  
Capacity to absorb legal costs/wealth: The capacity 
to absorb legal costs is supposed to be essential for the 
accomplishment of disputes as explicit compensation 
for litigation costs is not intended by the system. For 
this reason each potential complainant must anticipate 
substantial costs that are involved by prosecution and, 
if applicable, also by enforcement of compliance. It is 
assumed that the number of complaints is positively 
related to a Member’s capacity to absorb legal costs. 
As proxy for such financial means we use a country’s 
GDP, provided by [6] and [7]. 
Legal capacity: One argument often raised to 
explain the limited access of the system to developing 
and low income countries is their lack of human and 
legal capacity (see e.g. [8]). [2] found empirical 
evidence on the matter of a country’s legal capacity in 
respect of initiating disputes. We hypothesise that the 
larger a country’s endowment with skilled legal 
personnel, the higher its capability to challenge 
arguable trade measures of its trading partners and we 
expect the number of bilateral complaints to be 
positively linked. Since there is no differentiated 
information on Members’ legal capability we use, like 
[2], their delegation size at Geneva as proxy. The 
respective information comes from [9].  
Influence of private actors and governmental 
efficiency: The influence of private pressure groups on 
the government is relevant as only the government 
may finally enter a dispute but can be persuaded by 
private actors in doing so. This power may differ 
among countries depending on the national framework 
for organizing private lobby activities and on their 
respective relevance. For this purpose two domestic 
variables are included which are provided by [10]: (i) 
the Corporate Legal Corruption Component (CLCC), 
measuring legal dimensions of undue political 
influence by the private sector and (ii) the 
Judicial/Legal Effectiveness Integrity Index (JLEI), 
assessing the effectiveness and integrity of the legal 
and judicial system. The greater the influence of 
lobbyists, e.g. by legal political finance or by the voice 
of interests of powerful firms, the more successful the 
private sector is supposed to be in achieving its export 
interests. Accordingly, the number of challenged 
disputes should be positively correlated to the amount   4 
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of undue influence, aggregated in the CLCC variable. 
It is hypothesized, that the higher the efficiency and 
integrity of the legal and judicial system of a country, 
the higher its ability to identify illegal trade measures 
and to pursue a legal action. Hence, the probability for 
litigation is presumed to be positively dependent on 
the JLEI variable.  
Membership time: The time of membership may be 
negatively related to the costs of filing a dispute as 
learning occurs. Hence, we suspect a Member’s 
experience through its membership in the WTO to be 
positively related to its number of filed disputes. An 
index is created over the time since the inception of 
the organization until June 30, 2006, relating each 
Member’s membership time to the whole observation 
period. The associated data is from [11].  
IV. STATISTICAL IMPLEMENTATION AND 
RESULTS 
For the restricted model, improved model prediction 
is merely owing to the introduction of thresholds for 
accounting only export flows beyond a certain value. 
The average number of export flows declines from 
5530 in case of no threshold to 65 when the highest 
threshold of $700K is used. The fit of the model is 
measured by two different indicators: the fraction of 
exact predictions and the mean absolute deviation 
(MAD) between observed and predicted disputes. 
Both indicators prove that the thresholds regarding 
the incorporation of export flows is important as 
raising the threshold increases the fit of the model. 
This result supports the findings of [2] that the pattern 
of dispute initiation is to a large extent reflected by 
differences in Members’ diversity and value of trade. 
The threshold of $300K has no substantial influences 
on the results compared to no threshold. Using the 
middle threshold of $500K, the MAD decreases by 
30% to 1.67 compared to 2.38 for the model without 
threshold. The fraction of exact predictions increases 
from 23% to 43%. When the highest threshold is 
applied, the MAD decreases further by 38% to 1.04 
while the fraction of exact predictions slightly 
increases to 49%.  
For the unrestricted model the Akaike information 
criterion is utilized to select the relevant variables. 
Based on this, the incorporation of additional variables 
is traded off against the increased fit of the model, thus 
mitigating the danger of over-fitting. It is then sought 
after the model specification showing the lowest 
information criterion value. The proceeding is 
stepwise: Starting from the restricted model, one 
additional variable is included and corresponding 
information criterion calculated. In the next step the 
variable that yielded the lowest value is retained and 
the additions of the remaining variables are assessed 
one by one. Additional variables are included as long 
as they reduce the information criterion. For the final 
model, standard errors of the coefficients are derived 
using the bootstrap methods. The quality of the 
unrestricted model is further on validated by a 
likelihood ratio test.  
According to this proceeding only four of the 
considered determinants are retained in the final 
model: (1) Endured protectionism, (2) Own imposed 
protectionism, (3) Influence of pressure groups and (4) 
WTO membership time result in a sufficient increase 
in the goodness of fit for no threshold and the 
threshold $300K. For the application of the $500K 
threshold the variable Influence of pressure groups and 
for the highest threshold of $700K both Influence of 
pressure groups and Own imposed protectionism are 
discarded in the selection process. All included 
variables show the hypothesized sign and except for 
the variable Influence of pressure groups, their 
influence is proven to be statistically significant. The 
variables’ joint significant influence is verified by an 
asymptotic significance test based on the bootstrapped 
sampling distribution of the estimator (see [12]). 
Compared to the restricted model, the fraction of 
correct predictions are slightly higher for all 
thresholds. The mean absolute deviation between 
observed and predicted complaints decreases as well. 
This is mainly due to improved model behaviour for 
Members with a large number of observed disputes, 
predominantly for the EC and the U.S. Both measures 
show that the model amendment is much higher for 
the $300K threshold and the specification without 
threshold. 
The likelihood ratio test proves a significant 
amendment of the model based on the incorporation of 
the addressed determinants. For the first three 
thresholds the concerned variables’ contribution could   5 
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be substantiated at a 1% level, for the highest 
threshold at a 10% level of significance.  
The findings of [2] on a significant influence of 
legal capacity could not be supported in our analysis 
of food related disputes. This may be explained by the 
fact that legal capacity increasingly becomes an 
internationally tradable good such that each Member 
can purchase legal expertise, provided that it has 
sufficient financial resources. On the other hand, the 
findings of [13] with respect to the influence of 
monetary means is not confirmed by our results either. 
Therefore, it seems more likely that legal capacity and 
monetary means are more relevant determinants for 
the overall number of dispute initiations but simply 
less important for the variation of probabilities across 
countries for the smaller food sector. 
The indicators on Governmental efficiency and 
Relevance of the agricultural sector did also not 
survive the variable selection process. The latter might 
simply be an insufficient proxy for the relevance of a 
Member’s agri-food-industry. Variables are not 
discarded due to multicollinearity, since the pairwise 
coefficient of correlation between selected and 
unselected variables is at most 0.34 for Legal capacity 
and WTO membership time. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The results show that some of the determinants 
relevant in previous dispute studies such as legal 
capacity and monetary means could not be confirmed 
as statistically relevant in the context of the agri-food 
sector. It could be shown that increasing own 
protectionist attitude lowers the probability to 
complain and the level of protection faced by a 
country leads to an increase as both variables prove to 
be statistically significant determinants of dispute 
initiation in the agri-food sector. At the same time, the 
duration of WTO membership clearly contributes to a 
larger likelihood to initiate a WTO dispute. Though 
selected for two of four possible model specifications 
with its expected sign, the Influence of private 
pressure groups does not turn out to show a significant 
influence. Further research should focus on the 
improvement of data quality to validate or disprove 
the findings on insignificant influences of some 
variables, for example the importance of the agri-food 
sector for the country considered. A generalisation of 
the model allowing to simultaneously incorporate 
characteristics of the defendant country would also be 
very useful. Currently, the implied assumption that 
probabilities to be a defendant is equal across all 
countries could only be partially mitigated by 
including the determinant Endured protectionism of 
the complaining country. 
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